Costa Rica Civil War

With more than 2,000 dead, the 1948 44-day civil war was the bloodiest event in 20th-century Costa Rican history.

Background on Ferrer

Caribbean Legion

Before the elections of 1948, Figueres had already been planning for war. Unlike Ulate, Cortés, and the other members of the Opposition, Figueres felt that Calderón would never allow a fair election to take place. Figueres began training the Caribbean Legion, an irregular force of 700. Figueres launched a revolution along with other landowners and student agitators, hoping to overthrow the Costa Rican government. Hoping to use Costa Rica as a base, the Legion planned next to remove the three Central American dictators. Washington officials were not amused. They closely watched the Legion’s activities, especially after Figures carried out a series of terrorist attacks inside Costa Rica during 1945 and 1946 that was supposed to climax in a general strike. But the people did not respond.

1948 Elections and street protests

The National Republicans whose candidate President Picado was running for a second term, and who had held the majority of Costa Rica's political power for decades. Not willing to give up their monopoly control of the Executive branch, the National Republicans used their strong influence in the Legislative Assembly to annul the February 8 presidential election of rival candidate Otilio Ulate Blanco of the Social Democratic Party. The country was thrown into bitter chaos, as both sides accused the other of vote tampering and electoral fraud.

During the fiasco that resulted in the civil war, the Picado administration resorted several times to the use of the military in order to keep the peace. On top of this, pro-Calderón elements within the military institution would often become involved in street violence as participants rather than as peacekeepers, all of which helped to sully the image of the military in the minds of the people. As the violence grew, supporters of the Opposition began to carry guns to protect demonstrators from the police, and the police began to threaten the use of firearms rather than just beating demonstrators with nightsticks. Disgust with the government's violent reprisals against the Opposition led to the Huelga de brazos caidos, a strike that stalled commerce in Costa Rica for seven days. Pro-Calderón and communist demonstrators began to sack those businesses that participated in the strike, and Picado was forced to respond to the strike with force by intimidating merchants and professionals and threatening workers with dismissal and military service. By the end of the strike, police and military forces patrolled the streets, and San José appeared as if it had been under siege.5

One particularly nasty event took place on the day the government annulled the 1948 elections. Without Picado's approval or support, the police surrounded the home of Dr. Carlos Luis Valverde, where Ulate was and Figueres had been only moments before. Shots rang out, and Valverde fell dead on his doorstep. Ulate escaped but was later captured and imprisoned, all of which helped to paint an especially distasteful image of the military

Beginning of Civil War

The annulment of the election results in 1948 and the attack on Dr. Valverde's home on the same day appeared to provide for Figueres the proof that he needed to show that the government had no intention of ceding to the will of the people. His hatred for Calderón, combined with his idealism, fueled his desire for war. On March 11, Figueres made the call that brought in the arms and military leaders Figueres needed for a successful campaign. On March 12, his National Liberation Army exchanged fire with government forces, and the war began.

Figueres help from Guatemala President Arévalo

Figueres then made a decision that reverberated in Central America for the next thirty years. He turned for help to President Juan José Arévalo of Guatemala. Arévalo had become the leading liberal figure in Central America, indeed in much of Latin America, after assuming power in 1945. But Arévalo not only had high hopes for a new Guatemala. He wanted nothing less than a new Central America in which Somozas could be destroyed and replace by a democratic regional union. The Guatemalan had the prestige and the arms to start such a campaign, so Figueres convinced him that the first step must be to overthrow President Picado. In late 1947, Figueres and other Central American exiles signed the Pact of the Caribbean in which they pledged to free the region of dictators. The instrument of removal was to the Caribbean Legion, supplied largely by Guatemala. With this one step a long chain reaction began. A war to the death started between Figueres and Somoza, a war that finally ended with the destruction of Somoza's rule in 1979.

Fall of Cartago

The National Liberation Army, as they called themselves, slowly worked their way up the Pan American Highway, capturing small but important cities and ports with relative ease.

The army, which was then led by Picado's brother, offered the greatest resistance to Figueres' National Liberation Army, though Figueres had also to contend against the Popular Vanguard Party/Vanguardia Popular and Nicaraguan soldiers who had been sent by Somoza to help the government retain power.

In Cartago, Costa Rica's second-largest city located only twelve miles from the capital, Figueres' forces met some considerable military opposition; however, the limited forces and supplies of the governmental forces quickly ran out, and Cartago fell into the hands of Figueres on April 12. Costa Rican President Picado, realizing that defeat was inevitable, sent notice to Figueres that he was willing to come to a compromise.

Picado's long-time political ally, Manuel Mora Valverde of the Communist-affiliated party Vanguardia Popular, had no intention of negotiating with Figueres. Mora's forces had sealed themselves up inside the capital of San José, and were determined not to capitulate as quickly as Picado. As the target of many of Figueres' criticisms about Costa Rica, Mora and his party were worried that a Figueres-led takeover might well lead to their expulsion from politics.

Figueres and United States Policy

Arévalo help provided to be indispensable. As usual, however, the determining force was United States policy. The creators of that policy held little love for Figueres, but they were determined to destroy the ‘’Vanguardia Popular’’. Perhaps the Communist party had only seven thousand members, Ambassador Davies reported home, but it should hold the balance of political power in Congress and also constituted “some 70 percent of the police and army.” Writing within hours after the Communist overthrow of the Czechoslovak government (an event that severely shook Washington and other Western capitals), Davis warned that Costa Rica's condition was “in many respects similar to that prevailing in Eastern Europe.” When the State Department learned on 17 April 1948 that small Communist groups threatened to take over the capital of San Jose, US troops were placed on alert in the Canal Zone. Their mission was to move quickly into Costa Rica and stop the revolution before the Vanguardia Popular consolidated its power. It was a false alarm, but it indicated that regardless of any Good Neighbor policy sentiments, the possibility of unilateral U.S. intervention was no mere abstraction. 2

Throughout the conflict, Figueres received a steady supply of arms from Arévalo, while Picado’s forces were unable to exploit Somoza’s desire to help. The United States had ensured Somoza’s political impotence. Desperately wanting Nicaraguan help, Picado pleased with Ambassador Davis to allow what was, after all, the recognized Costa Rican government to obtain help from Nicaragua so it could remain in power. Davis blandly “explained our well known policy of non-intervention” and then referred to the obligations of American nations [to] non-intervene.” Picado bitterly observed that non-intervention was a fiction, Figueres had received “tons” of supplies from Arévalo, and rumors circulated of aid even from the Panamanian government. Davis ignored the charges. Picado then threatened to take the matter to the United Nations. “The United Nations machinery was cumbersome,” the State Department suavely but directly reminded the Costa Rican leader, and “immediate action on the part of the Council [Where the United States had a veto and controlled the majority of the votes] could probably not be expected.

Surrender of Picado

By its mobilization in the Canal Zone, constant pressure on Picado, and cutting off Somoza’s help, the United States determined the outcome of the revolution in April 1948.

With more than 2,000 dead, the 44-day civil war resulting from this uprising was the bloodiest event in 20th-century Costa Rican history.

Civil War repercussions

Despite the fact that this civil war alone was relatively small in scale-its duration was short and about two thousand casualties- its consequences have had lasting results on the country and the region as a whole.

The private sponsorship of Figueres by the US led United States forces to intervene in other politics and governments of Latin America, such as what was later seen in Guatemala in 1954 and Chile in 1973.
The strong ties that came about due to US aid helped to lift Costa Rica out of the economic instability that it had been facing in the years before the revolution.
The new articles of the constitution rewritten by Figueres' regime eliminated the fraudulent aspect of elections that had been an identifiable part of Costa Rica's electoral processes in the past. The new constitution also abolished the army, and gave Blacks and women the right to vote. Costa Rica, once a country full of governmental fraud and corruption, became a respectable democracy of the West and a proud ally of the United States, as well as a model for other Latin American countries in how to properly establish democracy and successfully revitalize the economy.